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Is OSHA Unconstitutional?
Cass R. Sunstein
I.

Introduction
Imagine that Congress creates a federal agency to deal with a large problem, one

that involves a significant part of the national economy. Suppose that Congress instructs
the agency: Do what you believe is best. Act reasonably and appropriately. Adopt the
legal standard that you prefer, all things considered. Suppose, finally, that these
instructions lack clear contextual referents, such as previous enactments or judicial
understandings,1 on which the agency might build.
If the nondelegation doctrine exists, as the Supreme Court proclaims,2 then this
hypothesized statute would seem to violate it. After all, the Court has not overruled or
even questioned its decision in the Schechter Poultry case, striking down the National
Industrial Recovery Act.3 On the contrary, the Court has continued to insist on the need
for an “intelligible principle” by which to limit the exercise of agency discretion.4
Remarkably, however, the core provision of one of the nation’s most important
regulatory statutes – the Occupational Safety and Health Act – is not easy to distinguish
from the hypothesized statute. That provision defines an “occupational safety and health
standard” as one that is “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment or places of employment.”5 When the Secretary of Labor issues regulations
governing tractors, ladders, or electrical equipment, the only question to be asked is
whether one or another standard is “reasonably necessary or appropriate.”
Notably, this language appears in a mere definitional clause, not in a separate
substantive provision instructing the Secretary what, exactly, he is supposed to consider
in deciding what to do. Nor is the agency required to do whatever is “necessary,” strictly
speaking, in order to provide safe employment; its duty is softened, in the sense that it is
1

Contextual referents are emphasized in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp 737, 748
(DDC 1971) (“[T]he Court has made clear that the standards of a statute are not to be tested in isolation and
derive meaningful context from the purpose of the Act, its factual background, and the statutory
context.”)(internal citations omitted).
2
See Whitman v. American Trucking Assn., 531 US 457, 487 (2001; Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist concurring).
3
ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 US 495, 542 (1935).
4
Whitman, 531 US at 471; Industrial Union, 448 US at 685–86.
5
29 USC § 652(8).

told to do what is “reasonably necessary.” In fact the agency is not even required to do
that. Apparently it is permitted to reject what is “reasonably necessary” and instead to
select what is merely “appropriate.” And how does the agency decide what counts as
either “reasonably necessary” or “appropriate”? Suppose that the agency chooses to
proceed in strict accordance with cost-benefit analysis, treating that form of analysis as its
rule of decision. Is it permitted to do that, on the ground that what is “reasonably
necessary” or “appropriate” is whatever cost-benefit analysis counsels6? Or suppose that
the agency treats cost-benefit analysis as relevant but not conclusive, on the ground that
(say) $800 million in monetized safety benefits to workers justifies an expenditure of
$900 million on the part of employers (an expense that could result in increased prices,
decreased wages, or decreased employment). Would that approach be lawful? Or suppose
that the agency rejects cost-benefit analysis altogether, and decides to require employers
to eliminate all “significant” risks (however defined) to the extent that is “feasible”
(whatever that means). Is there anything in the “reasonably necessary or appropriate”
language to foreclose that approach?
It is tempting to respond that the constitutional problem would be solved if the
agency adopts subsidiary policy by which to discipline its own discretion.7 For example,
the agency might conclude that notwithstanding the vagueness of the statutory language,
the best way to proceed is through a strict cost-benefit test. But in 2001, the Supreme
Court squarely rejected the idea that a nondelegation problem can be cured by policy
judgments at the agency level.8 In the process – and this is the central difficulty, the
motivation for posing the central question here – the Court eviscerated the rationale of the
court of appeals decision that had upheld the “reasonably necessary or appropriate”
language against constitutional attack.9 And because of the sheer breath of the agency’s

6

For a theoretical argument to this general effect, see Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, New Foundations
for Cost-Benefit Analysis (2006).
7
This strategy is suggested in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp 737, 759 (DDC 1971)
(“Another feature that blunts the “blank check” rhetoric is the requirement that any action taken by the
Executive . . . must be in accordance with further standards as developed by the Executive.”). .
8
See American Trucking, 531 US at 472 (“We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute”).
9
International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (DC Cir 1994).
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power, extending to essentially all of America’s workers, the nondelegation objection is
especially acute under the Court’s own analysis.10
It is true that a narrowing construction from federal courts can rescue a statute
from a nondelegation challenge,11 but the question remains: What would be the content of
any such narrowing construction, if it is to qualify as a construction rather than simple
policymaking? The broadest difficulty is that with the “reasonably necessary or
appropriate” language, Congress appears, at least at first glance, to have made no
decision at all about the substantive standard under which the Secretary of Labor is
supposed to proceed. A reader might be tempted to conclude that Congress has said,
“make things better,” without giving the Secretary guidance about how, exactly, he is to
go about about accomplishing that task.
One of my central aims here is to explore the nondelegation problem in one of the
few settings in federal law in which that problem is genuinely acute under existing law.12
But the discussion is also meant to shed light on some pressing questions for both
regulatory policy and administrative law. Over 5000 Americans die each year in the
workplace,13 and more than four million are injured or sickened by the conditions of their
employment.14 Surely steps could be taken to reduce these deaths, injuries, and illnesses.
Under the statutory language, the Secretary is required to make a wide range of choices
about what, if anything, to demand of American employers and how, if at all, to protect
American workers. The agency should do far better than it does.15 What are the legal
limits on its authority? Is the agency entitled to do nothing at all? Is it entitled to be
aggressive, even draconian? Lurking questions involve consistency and transparency.
Suppose that one OSHA regulation protects a large number of lives at relatively low cost,
while another regulation protects a small number of lives at a relatively high cost.16

10

See American Trucking, 531 US at 473 (emphasizing importance of breadth of delegation).
See Industrial Union Dept., supra note, at 646 (“A construction of the statute that avoids this kind of
open-ended grant should certainly be favored.”).
12
After American Trucking, supra note, it seems clear that the Court has little interest in reviving the
nondelegation doctrine. See infra.
13
See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.t01.htm
14
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/osbl0003.pdf
15
A dated but still-relevant study is Thomas McGarity and Sidney Shapiro, Workers At Risk: The Failed
Promise of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (1993).
16
This does in fact seem to be the pattern. See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory
Policy 26-27 (6th ed. 2006).
11
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Suppose too that the agency’s explanations for its decisions are often opaque, so that it is
hard to understand why the agency chose one level or regulation rather than another, and
how the agency sets its own priorities.17 Can anything be done, before or within the
agency or in courts, to ensure against crazy-quilt patterns, to clarify why the agency is
aggressive in some domains and lenient in others, and to ensure a degree of
accountability, rather than a technocratic smokescreen or fog?
As we shall see, there are three possible answers to these questions. The most
aggressive would be to strike down the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language
on constitutional grounds. A real attraction of this approach is that it would inevitably
trigger a democratic debate about the proper content of occupational safety and health
policy – a debate that would in all likelihood be more sophisticated and constructive than
the crude discussion, over thirty years ago, that initially produced OSHA.18 On the other
hand, courts have been reluctant to invoke the nondelegation doctrine to strike down
federal legislation, and for exceedingly good reasons.19 A decision to invalidate OSHA
would send shock waves through the federal regulatory state, and courts should hesitate
before doing that.
The least aggressive approach, rooted in the Avoidance Canon, would be to
respond to the apparent vagueness of the statutory language by making a serious effort to
use that language to create floors and ceilings on agency action. Such an effort might
plausibly yield three principles. First, the statute requires the agency to regulate serious or
significant risks; second, it forbids the agency from regulating small or trivial risks; and
third, it requires the agency to respect the constraints of feasibility. As we shall see,
judicial insistence on these three requirements would not answer all of the concerns of
those attracted to the nondelegation objection, but they would go a long way in that
direction, while significantly helping to improve the operation of the statutory scheme.
17

See infra.
For an outline of the original statute, written near the time of its enactment, see David Currie, OSHA,
1976 Am Bar Assn Res. J. 1107; for an excellent discussion of the policy dilemmas and of how (poorly) the
statute handles them, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics – and the New
Administrative Law, 98 Yale LJ 341 (1998).
19
The most valuable discussion is Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U Chi L Rev 1721 (2002) (challenging the nondelegation doctrine on originalist and welfarist
grounds); see also Stewart, supra note (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine is not administrable by
federal judges). My goal here is not to evaluate the legitimacy or value of the nondelegation doctrine.
Instead I take the doctrine as a given for purposes of discussion.
18
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A third approach, and in some ways the most attractive, would be to construe the
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” language to mandate some form of cost-benefit
balancing. On a plausible view, a regulation is not “reasonably necessary” if the benefits
do not justify the costs, and the word “appropriate” plainly suggests balancing. One
version of this approach would require the agency to use cost-benefit analysis as the rule
of decision, so that regulations could go forward only if the monetized benefits exceed
the monetized costs. But in the context of workplace safety, where distributional concerns
are obviously relevant, a strict monetary test would run into serious problems. A softened
and preferable version would require the Secretary to calculate both costs and benefits
and to find a “reasonable relationship” between the two.20 An approach of this general
kind is probably the best response to the nondelegation challenge, and it would also have
the important virtue of promoting both transparency and coherence in occupational safety
policy. At the same time, any kind of cost-benefit reading would raise serious questions
about the application of cost-benefit principles to the distinctive context of occupational
safety, where those principles might not readily apply, at least not in their standard form.
I will offer some brief suggestions about how those questions might be answered.
II.

Occupational Safety, Occupational Health, and Delegation
To understand the constitutional issue, it is necessary to explore a complex line of

cases. Notably, no one has challenged OSHA regulations on constitutional grounds since
1994.21 But rulings in that period place the constitutional problem in sharp relief. The
central problem is hat the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncements, apparently designed to
restrict the use of the nondelegation doctrine, eliminate the existing line of defense for the
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” language.22
A.

Benzene
The constitutional debate over OSHA began quite unexpectedly in 1980, with the

Secretary of Labor’s effort to reduce permissible exposure limits to benzene, a known
carcinogen. In that case, no constitutional objection was raised by the parties. Instead the
20

Industrial Union, 448 US at 667 (Powell concurring).
See International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (DC Cir 1994).
22
American Trucking, supra note, at 472.
21
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Court was asked to answer what turned out to be a surprisingly difficult question of
statutory construction: When the Secretary is regulating carcinogens, what is the legal
standard23? To answer that question, the Court had to deal with two independent
provisions. The first included the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language. The
second was the provision more specifically governing toxic substances and harmful
physical agents, which reads, in full, as follows24:
“The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of
his working life.”
One of the Court’s key tasks was to reconcile the “reasonably necessary or
appropriate” language, which applies to all occupational safety and health standards, with
the “no employee will suffer” language, which is limited to standards involving “toxic
materials or harmful physical agents.” The Court had three principal options. First, it
could have said that the two provisions, taken together, call for some form of cost-benefit
analysis. Perhaps a standard is not “reasonably necessary or appropriate” unless the
benefits exceed the costs; perhaps a standard is not “feasible” if the costs are high and the
benefits are low. Second, the Court could have said, as the government vigorously
urged,25 that the Secretary of Labor is forbidden from regulating on the basis of costbenefit analysis, and must instead regulate to the point of (economic and technological)
feasibility whenever at least one “employee will suffer material impairment” as a result
of exposure. Third, the Court could have said that a risk could be regulated only if it rose
to a certain level of significance, in the sense that a statistically small risk (1 in 1 million?
1 in 100 million? 1 in 50 million?) would not justify regulatory controls.
Each of these positions attracted support within the Court. Justice Powell favored
a form of cost-benefit balancing, in the sense that he would require the agency “to
determine that the economic effects of its standard” bore “a reasonable relationship to the
23

See Industrial Union Dept., supra note, at 611.
29 USC § 655(b)(5).
25
448 US at 666.
24
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expected benefits.”26 In his view, a standard is neither “reasonably necessary” nor
“feasible” if the expenditures are “wholly disproportionate to the expected health and
safety benefits.”27 This conclusion makes some intuitive sense, but as a matter of
interpretation, it runs into evident problems. The toxic materials provision governs
benzene (a toxic substance), and that provision requires the Secretary to set the standard
that “most adequately assures . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health . . . .” Suppose that a regulation would cost $900 million but would save five
workers from “material impairment of health.” On standard assumptions about the
monetary valuation of human life, producing a figure of around $6 million,28 such a
regulation would impose costs that are disproportionate to benefits. But under the
statutory language, the agency must nonetheless ensure “that no employee will suffer” -and hence it would be required to proceed even if the monetized costs greatly exceed the
monetized benefits.
To be sure, the word “feasible” operates as a firm limit on what the Secretary
might do. No regulation may be issued if it is not “feasible.” But in light of the structure
of the sentence, “feasible” means practicable, in the sense of capable of being done, and
does not entail cost-benefit balancing. If “feasible” referred to cost-benefit balancing, it
would be inconsistent with the “no employee will suffer” language, because a costbenefit test would allow a number of employees to “suffer.” And so the Court ruled in a
subsequent decision, drawing on ordinary meaning and the structure of the statute to
suggest that feasible means “practicable.”29 (I shall turn shortly to some evident puzzles
here, involving the meaning of feasibility.)
In a dissenting opinion commanding four votes, Justice Marshall adopted the
second position, urged by the government in defense of the benzene regulation.30 He
contended that the toxic materials provision, with its “no employee will suffer” language,
prohibited cost-benefit balancing, and also imposed no requirement that the agency show
26

448 US at 667.
Id.
28
The value of a statistical life is around $6 million. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear (2006).
29
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc v Donovan, 452 US 490, 508 (1981). To be sure, this idea
raises questions of its own. What, exactly, does it mean for a standard to be “practicable”? Suppose that
some percentage of affected businesses would fail if the regulation were imposed. What percentage would
be high enough to make the regulation no longer feasible?
30
448 US at 688.
27
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a risk to be significant, in the sense of exceeding a certain statistical threshold. In his
view, the specific provision governing toxic substances must prevail over the more
general “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language. Carefully parsing the text and
legislative history, Justice Marshall insisted that the agency was not required to quantify
the risk to establish that it rose to a level of significance.31
The Court’s plurality disagreed.32 Its key argument was that a standard would not
count as “reasonably necessary or appropriate” unless it would serve to eliminate a
“significant risk of harm.” The plurality struggled to defend its interpretation by reference
to the statutory text and history,33 and it conspicuously failed to come to terms with the
“no employee will suffer” requirement, which seemed to suggest that a statistically small
risk (say, one in five million) would trigger regulatory controls if the risk would produce
death or serious injury in a few employees. Lacking a clear anchor in the standard legal
materials,34 the plurality pointed instead to what it saw as the unfortunate implication of
Justice Marshall’s reading, which would “give OSHA power to impose enormous costs
that might produce little, if any, discernible benefit.”35 Here the Court seemed to suggest
a background principle for use in construing risk-reduction statutes: In the face of doubt,
such statutes should not be interpreted to authorize the government to impose substantial
burdens for trivial gains.36
To this the plurality added an explicit nondelegation concern: if the statute did not
require the risk to “be quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as
significant in an understandable way,” it might be unconstitutional, and courts should
favor a “construction . . . that avoids this kind of open-ended grant.”37 Citing Schechter
Poultry, the Court thus suggested a nondelegation canon, to the effect that courts should
favor a construction that grants an agency bounded rather than unbounded authority.38
The basic idea is a variation on, or a specification of, the more general Avoidance Canon,

31

Id. at 714
Id at 639–40.
33
Id. at 639–649.
34
See, eg, John Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup Ct Rev 223,
244.
35
448 US at 645.
36
See the discussion in Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 Mich L Rev 1651 (2001).
37
448 US at 646.
38
See Manning, supra note.
32
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asking courts to avoid serious constitutional issues by requiring Congress to speak
unambiguously if it seeks to raise such issues.39 If Congress intends to grant an agency
open-ended authority, to an extent that raises serious nondelegation concerns, it must
make its will plain.40
For present purposes, the key opinion came from then-Justice Rehnquist.41 He
contended that the key provisions amounted to “a legislative mirage, appearing to some
Members but not to others, and assuming any form desired by the beholder.”42 In his
view, the words “to the extent feasible” rendered the toxic substances provision “largely,
if not entirely, precatory.”43 Justice Rehnquist did not argue that a nondelegation problem
would arise if Justice Powell were correct; a requirement of cost-benefit balancing hardly
offends the Constitution, even though a number of supplemental judgments must be made
to make such balancing operational.44 Nor did Justice Rehnquist argue that if Congress
meant to enact the interpretation favored by the plurality, the statute would create any
constitutional problem. If Congress instructed an agency to regulate all “significant risks”
to the point of “feasibility,” the agency would retain considerable discretion, but not to an
extent that would violate the nondelegation doctrine.45 And while the plurality suggested
that the government’s interpretation would be constitutionally troublesome, Justice
Rehnquist did not make that claim, which is hard to take seriously: Surely Congress holds
the constitutional power to require aggressive and cost-blind regulation of workplace
risks, whether or not the underlying risks can be shown to be significant. (For
nondelegation purposes, there is all the difference in the world between a draconian
statute, which tells an agency to impose stringent regulation, and an open-ended statute,
which asks an agency to select its own standard.) Justice Rehnquist essentially urged that
so long as the nondelegation doctrine exists, Congress must make some choice among the
three principal interpretive possibilities. If it has failed to do so – if all courts have is a

39

See Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116, 130 (1958) .
Id.
41
448 US at 671.
42
Id at 681.
43
Id. at 682.
44
See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1992); for a critique, see Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman,
Priceless (2006).
45
See American Trucking, supra note.
40
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“mirage” -- then any intelligible principle must be supplied by the agency itself, in
violation of the Constitution.
Eight members of the Court disagreed with Justice Rehnquist, not on the ground
that the italicized claim is wrong, but on the ground that Congress did, in fact make the
relevant choice. For present purposes, the larger point is that the division within the Court
raises an obvious question: Suppose the toxic substances provision is not involved and
that the agency is guided only by the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language.
How, if at all, would the agency be constrained? The question is far from fanciful,
because much of the agency’s work does not involve toxic substances, and hence the
more specific provision, with its “no employee will suffer” and “to the extent feasible”
language, does not seem to be applicable at all.
B.

Safety standards, health standards, and the new nondelegation doctrine
1. The challenge. The issue reached the court of appeals in 1991.46 The case

involved the agency’s regulation of industrial equipment that might move suddenly and
hence produce injuries. The regulation required two procedures: “lockout” and “tagout.”
With “lockout,” certain equipment must be locked, so as to ensure that no movement can
occur. With “tagout,” a plastic warning must placed on equipment, informing workers
that the equipment should not be operated unless the tag is removed. In issuing the
regulation, the agency said that the toxic substances provision was inapplicable and that it
was governed only by the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language.47 In the
agency’s view, the statute drew a sharp distinction between “safety standards” and
“health standards,” and the more stringent “no employee shall suffer” provision was
applicable only to the latter.
Rejecting the agency’s position, the United Auto Workers argued that the toxic
substances provision did apply and hence that the agency must apply the “significant
risk/feasibility” framework established in American Petroleum. Noting that the toxic
substances provision included a reference to “harmful physical agents,” the United Auto
Workers contended that this provision literally applies to dangerous equipment, which is

46
47

International Union v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991).
Id. at 1313.
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a “physical agent.” The court responded that this argument was a form of sophistry.48 In
its view, Congress appeared to have drawn a distinction between health risks and safety
risks. To support this point, the court noted that the phrase “harmful physical agents”
appeared in a separate provision that seemed to involve health (“toxic substances and
other harmful agents”) rather than safety; it concluded that at the very least, the agency
could reasonably conclude that the toxic releases provision applied only to health
standards.49
The court’s conclusion meant that in issuing safety standards, the Secretary was
governed only by the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” provision. With the
background provided by Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in American Petroleum, the
National Association of Manufacturers challenged that provision as an unconstitutional
delegation. In responding to that challenge, the agency outlined its understanding of its
statutory authority.50 It agreed that it would have to establish a “significant risk.” It added
that it could not regulate beyond the point that was “both technologically and
economically feasible.” But it did not treat feasibility as a floor; it could, if it chose,
regulate far less aggressively. In the court’s words, “the upshot is an asserted power, once
significant risk is found, to require precautions that take the industry to the verge of
economic ruin . . . or to do nothing at all.”51
The court acknowledged that because agency standards must be applied across
broad categories, the agency could not punish particular companies that it did not like,
and hence a central nondelegation concern, involving favoritism, was reduced.
Nonetheless, some potentially “dangerous favoritism” remained, since stringent standards
might come down especially hard on small firms and favor large ones.52 Thus the
agency’s understanding “would give the executive branch untrammeled power to dictate
the vitality and even the survival of whatever segments of American business it might
choose.”53 The court emphasized that the agency’s discretion covered all of American

48

Id at 1314.
Id. at 1314.
50
Id at 1318.
51
Id at 1317.
52
Id at 1318.
53
Id at 1318.
49
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enterprise, not a single industry, and that the delegation did not involve a power
particularly conferred on the president, such as the power over foreign policy.
How might the nondelegation problem be cured? Emphasizing the importance of
predictability and the rule of law, the court’s evident preference was for a narrowing
construction by the agency, perhaps involving a form of cost-benefit analysis.54 Evidently
the court believed that a key purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to control agency
discretion, and that if the agency adopted a form of self-binding through a commitment to
cost-benefit analysis, the constitutional problem would be solved. In other words, the
agency might supply the requisite “intelligible principle” on its own, and in that way
overcome the nondelegation challenge. And indeed, the court insisted that cost-benefit
analysis would be compatible with statutory text and history.55 The word “reasonably”
suggests balancing, associated as it is with the “reasonable man” standard in tort law.56
Unfortunately, the court did not acknowledge that the word “reasonably” modifies
“necessary,” and hence the statute failed to impose a freestanding obligation to be
“reasonable” – perhaps a problem for the cost-benefit interpretation. But the statutory
phrase is “reasonably necessary or appropriate,” and surely the word “appropriate” could
(reasonably) be understood to entail cost-benefit balancing. Thus the court refused to
strike down the statute, emphasizing that it could be interpreted to allow such balancing,
and could therefore be construed to be constitutional.57
2. The agency’s response. On remand, the agency declined the court’s invitation
to construe the statute to require cost-benefit balancing.58 But it did attempt to a form of
self-binding through an intelligible principle, or rather through an assortment of such
principles. Thus the agency listed six principles that would limit its discretion59:
a.
b.
c.
d.

The risk must be significant.
Compliance must be economically feasible.
Compliance must be technologically feasible.
The standard must use the most cost-effective measures.

54

Id 1319 (“Cost-benefit analysis is certainly consistent with the language of § 3(8).”).
Id 1319.
56
Id at 1319.
57
Id. 1321.
58
International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (DC Cir 1994).
59
Id. at 668.
55
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e. The agency must explain its adoption of a standard departing from any
national consensus standard.
f. The agency must explain its standard by reference to record evidence and also
explain any inconsistency with prior agency practice.
The court of appeals thought that by themselves, these principles were not
sufficient to rescue OSHA, because they gave the agency too much room to “roam”
between different levels of stringency.60 But the agency added a final criterion. Looking
at various other sections, the agency said that it has to “provide a high degree of
employee protection,” moving close to the point of feasibility.61 Because the agency
could “deviate only modestly from the stringency of” the health standards, the court said
that the agency’s approach imposed sufficient discipline to rescue the statute from
nondelegation attack.62 The central idea seemed to be that once a significant risk was
shown, the agency would regulate at least close to the point of feasibility. The agency
was therefore bound by a set of constraints that amounted, as a whole, to the equivalent
of the requisite intelligible principle; the nondelegation problem was therefore cured.
The court’s rationale here raises some immediate questions: What does
“feasibility” mean? When, exactly, does regulation because so stringent that it is no
longer “feasible” to comply with it? If a regulation is expensive, it is likely to endanger at
least one or a few firms. Is such a regulation not “feasible” for that reason? Or are
massive business failures required? If the agency says the latter, then it faces an evident
problem: Under that approach, any particular regulation will move industry to the brink
of massive business failures, and that step will make other regulations impossible to
absorb even if they are relatively inexpensive. In practice, the agency cannot possibly
choose regulations that put whole industries on the brink of failure. In this light, a great
deal of additional work would be helpful to understand actual agency practice in light of
the feasibility condition – and appropriate legal constraints on that practice. For present
purposes, the key point is that because of the agency’s emphasis on the need for
stringency, the court of appeals found that the nondelegation objection was answered.

60

Id. at 669.
Id at 669.
62
Id at 669.
61
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C.

The dead nondelegation doctrine
The court of appeals holdings just discussed suggest a simple principle: If a

statute is an unconstitutional delegation as written, it can nonetheless be saved as a
result of subsidiary policymaking by the agency, in the form of a narrowing construction,
even if that construction is merely optional in light of the standard sources of statutory
interpretation. This principle amount to a new nondelegation doctrine. But in 2001, the
Supreme Court unambiguously rejected that doctrine.63
The case tested the meaning and validity of a key provision of the Clean Air Act,
one that appears similar to the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” phrase. That
provision asks the EPA to issue national ambient air quality standard to the point
“requisite to protect the public health.”64 Building on its OSHA decisions, the court of
appeals held that the statutory phrase was an unconstitutional delegation, because it
lacked an intelligible principle.65 What counts as “requisite”? The court thought that
Congress had not answered that question. “Here it is as though Congress commanded the
EPA to select ‘big guys,’ and EPA announced that it would evaluate candidates based on
height and weight, but revealed no cut-off point.”66 At the same time, the court said that
the EPA could issue a narrowing construction that would save its constitutionality. In the
key sentence, the court said that “an agency wielding the power over American life
possessed by EPA should be capable of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit
of harm that takes into account population affected, severity and probability.”67 Unlike in
the OSHA cases, the court ruled that the statutory term explicitly banned the agency from
basing its decisions on cost-benefit analysis.68 But the agency would be permitted, and
indeed required, to act in accordance with some kind of quantitative “benefits analysis,”
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requiring regulation when the benefits reached a certain magnitude, and forbidding
regulation when the benefits did not reach that magnitude.69
The Supreme Court rejected this approach.70 First, it held that a narrowing
construction by the agency was neither here nor there.71 The nondelegation doctrine is
rooted in Article 1, section 1, and in the Court’s view, its purpose is therefore to require
that laws are made by the national legislature72; it follows that agency self-binding is
neither here nor there. Hence the intelligible principle must come from Congress itself. If
Congress has given an agency a blank check, it does not matter if that agency chooses to
narrow its discretion, certainly if the narrowing is based on the agency’s own policy
judgments. Second, the Court held that the statute, as written, was not an unconstitutional
delegation.73 National ambient air quality standards must be set at the level that is
“requisite to protect the public health.” This requirement means that such standards must
be “sufficient, but not more than necessary.”74 In the Court’s view, that constraint is
sufficient to overcome the nondelegation problem. The Court did emphasize that that
problem would be analyzed by reference to the scope of the agency’s power, which was
certainly broad in this case, covering as it did a wide assortment of industries75; but the
EPA’s discretion was far from uncabined by the statutory language.
At first glance, the Court’s analysis on this last point seems hopelessly
unsatisfying: How is the word “necessary” a useful limitation on agency discretion? The
objection of the lower court appears unanswered: Doesn’t this provision grant the agency
the discretion to proceed as stringently as it wishes, without imposing any kind of floor
and ceiling? But perhaps the Court’s conclusion is not as unhelpful as it seems. A
national ambient air quality standard could be characterized as more aggressive than
“necessary,” and therefore as unlawful, if it delivered benefits that are exceedingly small,
or if it regulated risks that do not concern ordinary people in ordinary life. As Justice
Breyer wrote, the statute “does not require the EPA to eliminate every health risk,
69
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however slight, at the expense of any economic risk, however great . . . .”76 In his view,
the statute does not authorize the agency “to eliminate all risk – “an impossible and
undesirable objective.”77 What counts as requisite to protect the public health will “vary
with background circumstances, such as the public’s tolerance of the particular health
risk in the particular context at issue.”78 Thus the agency should consider “the severity of
a pollutant’s adverse effects, the number of those likely to be affected, the distribution of
those adverse effects, and the uncertainties surrounding each estimate.”79
It follows from these remarks that some imaginable restrictions would violate the
statute, because they would go beyond the point that is “requisite.” Equally important, it
also follows that a national standard could be characterized as less aggressive than
“necessary” if it left a residual risk that was, in fact, significant.80 Suppose that in light of
the pollutant’s adverse effects, and the number of people at risk, the EPA’s standard was
inexplicably lenient. It might well be concluded that such leniency would be unlawful,
because it would fall short of the level “requisite to protect the public health.”81
We might go further. If Justice Breyer’s analysis is put together with the Court’s,
the EPA’s task may not be radically different from what was sought by the court of
appeals, that is, to devise “the rough equivalent of a generic unit of harm that takes into
account population affected, severity and probability.”82 Without some kind of generic
unit of harm, it might not be possible for the agency to give an adequate explanation of
why any particular regulation is more stringent or less stringent than necessary.83 And to
this extent, the simple words “requisite to protect the public health” do establish both
floors and ceilings on agency action.
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To reach this conclusion, courts might rely on the text, simple and brief though it
is, and need not engage in any especially aggressive form of statutory construction (as the
Supreme Court did in American Petroleum). The statutory terms in the relevant provision
of the Clean Air Act are plausibly taken to invite floors and ceilings – and do so while
forbidding the agency from engaging in cost-benefit balancing. We shall shortly see how
this analysis applies to OSHA.
III.

The Constitutional Problem

A.

OSHA’s unnoticed vulnerability
My principal topic is the meaning and validity of the “reasonably necessary or

appropriate” clause. It will be useful, however, to begin with a brief overview of the
agency’s practice.
1. Agency practice: a glance. Since 1994, OSHA safety regulations have not been
challenged on nondelegation grounds. But the agency has nonetheless issued a number of
such regulations. In explaining those regulations, the agency has typically offered an
account of the “pertinent legal authority,”84 which refers to the “reasonably necessary or
appropriate” language. In what has become a kind of boilerplate, cutting across
Republican and Democratic administrations, the agency has explained that a regulation
satisfies that standard “if it substantially reduces or eliminates significant risk; is
economically feasible; is technologically feasible; is cost effective; is consistent with
prior Agency action or is a justified departure; is supported by substantial evidence; and
is better able to effectuate the Act’s purposes than any national consensus standard it
supersedes.”85 A standard counts as economically feasible “if industry can absorb or pass
on the cost of compliance without threatening its long term profitability or competitive
structure.”86 A standard counts as cost-effective “if the protective measures it requires are
the least costly of the available alternatives that achieve the same level of protection.” In
addition, safety standards “must be highly protective.”87 The words “highly protective”
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are not themselves defined, but they are a clear bow in the direction of the holding in the
International Union case.
What does all this mean? Some of it means nothing at all, or at least nothing that
bears on the question at hand. Under existing administrative law doctrine, all agency
decisions must be either consistent with past action or a “justified” departure88; that
requirement does not come from OSHA, and it is irrelevant to a nondelegation challenge.
It is true that under OSHA, any regulation must be supported by substantial evidence,89
but the requirement of record evidence is hardly sufficient to respond to a nondelegation
objection, which points to an absence of statutory standards. Nor is any help provided by
the idea that any regulation must be “better able to effectuate the Act’s purposes” than the
standard that it supersedes. This idea merely replicates the idea that a departure must be
“justified,” and by itself, a reference to “the Act’s purposes” tell us exactly nothing about
what those purposes are.
It follows that the agency’s understanding can be reduced to three ideas: (1) the
risk must be significant; (2) the regulation must be feasible; and (3) within the continuum
bounded at one end by “very lenient” and at the other by “the constraint of feasibility, the
agency will choose what is “highly protective.” As I have noted, the word “feasible” is
misleading. No on-off switch separates the “feasible” from the “infeasible.” Inevitably,
the agency is exercising some discretion in deciding exactly how aggressive to be.
It is true that in assessing significant risk, the regulations often refer to the
passage in American Petroleum that estimated a significant risk as somewhere between a
one in a billion risk of death per cancer and a one in a thousand risk.90 For most of its
standards, OSHA calculates the significance of a risk in exactly these terms: it determines
the rate of death per 1000 workers, assuming a 45-year work life.91 If the risk of death is
above 1/1000, it qualifies as significant.92 As early as 1988, the agency said that a risk of
over 1.64/1000 counts as significant – and that a risk of 0.6/100,000 “may be
approaching a level that can be viewed as safe.”93 But many regulations—and the safety
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standards in particular—express significant risk in terms of the magnitudes of annual
deaths and injuries, rather than in terms of deaths per 1000 workers. With a bit of math
these can be recast in terms of deaths per 1000 workers,94 and informal calculations
reveal that whenever we know the magnitude of the annual death and injury rate, the risk
is greater than one death per 1000 workers (and this does not even count injuries).95 The
only exception is the standard for confined spaces, where the risk is indeterminate
because the size of the workforce is not given.96
As a general practice, the agency’s safety regulations do offer separate statements
of both costs and benefits, but the agency does not formally compare the monetized
benefits to the monetized costs to calculate “net” benefits. Costs are stated in dollars and
benefits are usually expressed in terms of deaths and injuries prevented. That is, both
benefits and costs are quantified, but usually only costs are monetized. Nonetheless,
assuming $6.8 million as the value of a life (OSHA’s preferred figure during this range),
every regulation—with one exception97—that claims to prevent deaths is justified, in
terms of cost-benefit analysis, on the basis of these prevented deaths alone (not even
taking injuries into account).
It is unclear why the agency only rarely explicitly monetizes prevented deaths or
injuries, but there is some evidence that the agency does monetize when the ultimate
question is close. For example, the agency monetized the 1.3 annual deaths its recent
electrical installation standard was intended to prevent, and then converted to 2005
dollars to yield $9.1 million in prevented death benefits. The regulation cost $9 million.98
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A recent confined space proposed standard stated monetized benefits of $85 million; the
regulation cost $77 million.99 Another case of conspicuous monetization is the
ergonomics standard,100 overturned by Congress.101 This standard was unique in that it
would have prevented only injuries and not deaths. The agency calculated the value of
the prevented injuries to be $9.1 billion, with costs of $4.5 billion.102 According to these
numbers, the ergonomics standard was not a “close call,”103 but the controversy
surrounding the sheer size of the proposed regulation presumably spurred explicit
monetization.
2. The surprising effect of American Trucking. The American Trucking decision
did not exactly invite greater use of the nondelegation doctrine. On the contrary, the
Court’s insouciant approach to the “requisite to protect the public health” language
suggested a noticeable absence of enthusiasm for the doctrine. Nonetheless (and there is
an obvious irony here), the Court’s rejection of the new nondelegation doctrine
eliminated the route by which the court of appeals had upheld the “reasonably necessary
or appropriate” language against constitutional attack. After American Trucking, it is
plain that a narrowing construction by the agency will not save an otherwise unacceptable
delegation. If OSHA is to be rescued from constitutional objection, it must be because of
what the statute says, not because of agency policymaking in the absence of legislative
guidance. Recall here the emphasis in American Trucking on the scope of the agency’s
power: Because OSHA covers essentially all American workers, the existence of
untrammeled discretion would be a serious problem.
We are now in a position to see the central difficulty. After American Trucking,
everything turns on whether the phrase “reasonably necessary or appropriate” sets out an
intelligible principle. To be sure, the statutory provision would be valid if it could be
treated as analogous to the national ambient air quality provisions of the Clean Air Act.
As we have seen, the Court upheld the phrase “requisite to protect the public health” on
the ground that it forbids cost-benefit balancing and calls for a cost-blind inquiry into
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how much regulation is “necessary.” In the Court’s view, that inquiry is not unguided.
But there are real difficulties in understanding OSHA to mean the same thing as the
Clean Air Act. As construed by the court of appeals, the words “reasonably necessary or
appropriate” are plausibly but not necessarily taken to authorize cost-benefit balancing –
and thus seem to leave it to the Secretary to decide whether the statute requires costbenefit analysis or not. In other words, Congress has not set out an intelligible principle
supporting or rejecting cost-benefit analysis. Whether standards must be based on that
form of analysis is for the agency to decide. Perhaps this is a fatal defect. Insofar as the
words “reasonably necessary or appropriate” are involved, Justice Rehnquist’s original
objection seems at least plausible: The agency has been authorized to chose whatever
principle it likes.
To be sure, the very idea of an “intelligible principle” poses its own difficulties.
What, exactly, does that idea mean? The best answer points to the purpose of the
nondelegation doctrine, which is to ensure that Congress, as the national lawmaker, does
not grant blank checks to the executive branch (or anyone else).104 If Congress has set out
an intelligible principle, agency discretion is sufficiently bounded. On this view, it might
well be unacceptable for Congress to tell an agency to do as it chooses or whatever “the
public interest requires” – unless the notion of the public interest, in context, offers
sufficient discipline.105 In this light, it should be clear that the difference between a
principle that is “intelligible” and one that is not is inevitably one of degree. The question
becomes how much discretion is too much discretion – a question that is not easily
administered by federal courts. The difficulty of judicial administration is a standard
objection to aggressive judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, even
assuming that it has firm constitutional roots.106 But as the doctrine now stands, it is
necessary to ask how, if at all, OSHA limits the agency’s room to “roam.”
How might courts respond to this problem? There are three possibilities.
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B.

Solutions and proposals
1. Invalidation. The most aggressive approach would be to invalidate the

provision on constitutional grounds. To be sure, invalidation would represent the first
invocation of the nondelegation doctrine to strike down a federal statute in over seventy
years (and only the third in the nation’s history107). In addition, it would send shock
waves through the administrative state. But unlikely as it seems, disruptive though it
would be, and radical as it would appear, that step is not entirely without appeal.
In American Trucking, the Court emphasized that the statutory phrase “requisite
to protect the public health” does not seem more open-ended that several other statutory
phrases that the Court has upheld against nondelegation attack. As we have seen, the
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” clause is plausibly different, because that phrase
seems to allow (but not to require) the agency to use some form of cost-benefit analysis
as a rule of decision. It would therefore be easy to distinguish American Trucking on the
ground that while Congress set out an intelligible principle to govern national ambient air
quality standards, it failed to do so in the context of occupational safety standards. The
basic idea would be that in the relevant provision of the Clean Air Act, Congress
instructed the agency to engage in a cost-blind analysis inquiry into how much protection
is “requisite,” whereas in OSHA, Congress left the agency at sea.
At the same time, invalidation would force, for the first time, a sustained
legislation encounter with the exceedingly difficult questions of policy raised by
occupational safety and health regulation. When the statute was originally enacted in
1970, Congress did not seriously grapple with those problems.108 Instead it rested content
with recognizing the existence of a problem and the need for a regulatory solution.109 In
the last decades, public officials have learned an immense amount about how to think
about regulation. Much of this learning might be brought to bear on a new enactment.110
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Of course there is disagreement about how best to incorporate what has been learned,111
but that is precisely the question for democratic engagement. This is not the place for a
sustained discussion of regulatory reform in the domain of occupational safety, but a few
notations might be helpful.
It is now clear, for example, that information disclosure is sometimes the best
response to serious risks.112 It is plausible to think that the first line of defense, in the
domain of worker safety, should be a requirement that employers inform employees
about the hazards that they face.113 In principle, disclosure should create an incentive to
increase safety at the same time that it should ensure that workers receive a wage
premium for the relevant risks.114 Congress might well instruct OSHA to ensure that
when the workplace exposes workers to risks above a certain threshold, they must be
warned.115
At the same time, we know a great deal about the limits of disclosure strategies,
stemming in part from bounded rationality on the part of those who must assess risks.116
There is reason to believe that many workers are “risk optimists,” reducing cognitive
dissonance by concluding that the workplace is safer than it actually is.117 To the extent
that this is so, information disclosure may not work. At the very least, it is necessary to
ensure that workers adequately process the information that they receive, in part so that
they do not conclude, falsely, that they are relatively immune from statistical risks.118 In
Congress might require the agency to supplement disclosure requirements in two
different ways. First, it might impose clear bans on risks that reasonable employees
would not be willing to run.119 Second, it might ban employers from exposing employees
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to certain risks when the monetized benefits of the ban outweigh the monetized costs, in a
variation on the Safe Drinking Water Act.120
Very plausibly, however, a strict cost-benefit test is not appropriate in this
context. Distributional considerations matter. It is imaginable, for example, that a $800
million cost would be justified for a benefit of $700 million in increased safety – if, for
example, the cost was borne mostly by consumers, and if the benefit took the form of 100
lives saved each year. Even if the monetized costs exceed the monetized cost under
standard assumptions about valuation,121 it is reasonable to think that the agency should
proceed in these circumstances. Perhaps the welfare effects of the regulation are
desirable, on net, whatever the monetized analysis suggests. Perhaps the welfare gains to
workers, in terms of safety, exceed the overall welfare losses (to employers, customers,
and workers themselves, who might find themselves with reduced wages or without
jobs). Monetary measures are based on willingness to pay, and it is possible that the
welfare gain is greater than the welfare loss even if the monetized costs are greater than
the monetized benefits. Even if this point does not hold, perhaps the regulation would be
justified on redistributive grounds. If workers gain a great deal in terms of safety, perhaps
the agency should proceed even if others (employers, consumers) lose more than workers
gain.
Of course it is conventional to think that the best way to handle distributive
considerations is through the tax system, with the suggestion that the intended
beneficiaries would be better off with a cash payment than with a regulatory requirement,
which may not help them much or even at all.122 It is possible that mandatory safety
regulations will result in reduced wages and decreased employment, and if so, it is not
clear that workers, as a whole, will benefit from such regulations. Perhaps the losses in
terms of wages and employment opportunities exceed the gains in terms of safety. We
need to know something about the incidence of the various costs. If redistribution is the
goal, the tax system is the preferred means. But at least it can be said that an occupational
safety regulation might have desirable redistributive consequences, especially but not
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only if workers lack information – and if it does, the agency might legitimately take those
consequences into account.
On an attractive view, with roots in Justice Powell’s opinion in American
Petroleum, the agency should be required to show a “reasonable relationship” between
benefits and costs, and distributional considerations, and concerns about equity, might
overcome what would follow from a strictly monetary test.123 It is important to know who
bears the costs and who enjoys the benefits, not merely the magnitude of both of these.
But my primary goal here is not to specify what Congress should require the agency to
consider. It is instead to suggest that there could be real value in democratic engagement
with that question, especially in light of the relevant learning in the last decades.124 One
argument for use of the nondelegation doctrine – or perhaps it is a mere hope125 -- is that
invalidation of the statute might produce a better, because more informed, occupational
safety law.
2. Of significant and insignificant risks. If possible, courts should avoid the heavy
constitutional artillery, simply because of the disruption that invalidation would cause,
and because of the many problems with judicial use of the nondelegation doctrine.126 The
least aggressive approach would build on both the agency’s current practices and Justice
Breyer’s opinion in American Trucking so as to create floors and ceilings on agency
action. A central claim here would be that courts should construe the disputed provision
so as to avoid constitutional doubts – a principle that would, in this context, call for an
interpretation that would limit agency discretion. The result of a reasonable interpretation
would be to produce a band of judgments within which agency outcomes must fall. There
are three major points here.
The first is that after American Petroleum, we know that the agency must
establish that it is seeking to regulate a “significant” risk. It is not permitted to conclude
that a standard is “reasonably necessary or appropriate” if the risk is trivial. A judgment
about the significance of a risk would call for an assessment of both the magnitude and
the probability of harm. If, for example, an industry practice exposes hundreds of
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thousands of workers to a 1/1000 risk of mortality or serious injury, the risk
unquestionably qualifies as significant. As the exposed population becomes smaller, the
probability decreases, and the magnitude of the harm drops, it is harder to categorize the
risk as “significant.” As several decisions have held, some risks have not been shown to
be above the relevant floor.127 In this respect, OSHA does overlap with the Clean Air Act
at issue in American Trucking. While the latter statute forbids regulations that are not
“requisite to protect the public health,” and thus bans the agency from imposing
restrictions on trivial risks, the Court has made clear that OSHA has a similar
requirement,128 in the sense that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to proceed
unless the risk reaches a certain threshold.
The second point is that if a risk is significant, the agency is not permitted to
ignore it.129 If the agency regulates weakly, and another regulation would be far more
protection, it has failed to do what is “reasonably necessary or appropriate.” Indeed, the
agency might well be subject to judicial review if it fails to respond to a petition to
produce a rule dealing with a substantial safety problem.130 If the agency refuses to
address a significant risk, it had better explain itself. To this extent, OSHA is analogous
to the Clean Air Act; just as the agency cannot be too draconian, so too it cannot be too
lenient.131 In both contexts, there are both floors and ceilings on agency action. It is true
the words “reasonably” and “or appropriate” soften OSHA in ways that the word
“requisite” does not. But if the agency ignores a significant risk, or fails to eliminate such
a risk, it is required to offer a good explanation, made out in terms of statutorily relevant
factors.
The third point is that “feasibility” operates as a constraint on what the agency
might do or require.132 This conclusion is less than obvious, because the “reasonably
necessary or appropriate” language does not, by itself, constrain the agency in this way;
that language lacks a feasibility limitation. Perhaps the agency could deem a restriction
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“reasonably necessary” even if it would create serious economic dislocations – at least if
the underlying risk is sufficiently large. But there are two problems with this conclusion.
The first is that a regulation might well be considered neither “reasonably necessary” nor
“appropriate” if it would not be feasible as a matter of either economics or technology. A
restriction that would cause massive business failures would not seem to be
“appropriate.” By itself, this argument may not be decisive,133 but an argument from
statutory structure strongly supports this conclusion. Note that the more aggressive toxic
substances provision, governing health standards, contains an explicit feasibility
limitation,134 and it would be odd indeed to construe the less stringent and more general
definitional clause not to include the same limitation. In view of the statutory structure,
limiting health standards to the “feasible,” it makes sense to say that safety standards
must be feasible as well. As I have emphasized, the idea of feasibility is far from selfdefining, and inevitably it leaves a great deal of discretion to the agency. But that degree
of discretion does not create a serious constitutional issue.
Are these three limitations, taken as a whole, sufficient to save the statute against
a nondelegation challenge? Probably, but the answer is not obvious. If an intelligible
principle is required, floors and ceilings may not be enough; we might also need some
principle to tell us how to choose between the floor and the ceiling. As the court of
appeals observed in International Union,135 the three principles leave the agency with
considerable discretion on a crucial issue, which is stringency. Suppose that the agency
decided to regulate a significant risk to the maximum point, that is, the point of
feasibility. Apparently that decision would satisfy the statutory requirements. By contrast,
suppose that the agency decided to regulate a significant risk only slightly, to the point
where it would be cut in half. Perhaps that decision would be unlawful if it allowed a
significant risk to remain. But suppose that the agency decided to regulate a significant
risk, not to the point of feasibility, but to the extent justified by a strict cost-benefit test.
Suppose, in other words, that the agency concluded that a regulation of a significant risk
was “reasonably necessary or appropriate” only if the benefits exceeded the costs. At first
133
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glance, that approach would be consistent with the statute as well. It would be consistent,
but not mandatory – and the fact that the agency would have discretion to choose, on its
own, between “significant risk-feasibility,” or instead “significant risk-cost/benefit
balancing,” might seem to doom the statute on constitutional grounds.
The best response is that this degree of discretion, while substantial, does not
amount to a blank check. The three principles are sufficiently intelligible, and sufficiently
constraining, to respond to the constitutional objection. To those who reject this response
but want to avoid invalidation, there is a remaining option.
3. Cost-benefit analysis. That option would require some form of cost-benefit
analysis. The basic idea would be that the statutory text mandates that kind of analysis –
and that the agency is forbidden from refusing to base its decisions on some form of
balancing. Under the statutory phrase, the agency cannot proceed unless it has assessed
both costs and benefits, and shown that the latter justify the former.
It is easy to see the form that such a ruling might take. As the court of appeals
suggested in Industrial Union, the statute uses the term “reasonably necessary,” and the
adverb might well be taken to call for a form of balancing.136 We have seen that the word
“reasonably” distinguishes OSHA from the Clean Air Act provisions governing national
ambient air quality standards, which use the unmodified term “requisite.” The words “or
appropriate” strengthen the argument. Taken as a whole, the statutory phrase “reasonably
necessary or appropriate” might well be taken to suggest a general reasonableness
standard, one that requires benefits to justify costs. Courts of appeals have taken a similar
approach in the context of disability discrimination, in which the phrase “reasonable
accommodation” has been understood to require a plaintiff to show, not that an
accommodation passes a strict cost-benefit test, but that the costs would not be
disproportionate to the benefits.137 In the context of OSHA, such a construction would
have the additional benefit of eliminating the nondelegation problem. If courts can
construe the statutory language in such a way as to avoid that problem, they should do
exactly that.

136
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See 998 F.2d at 1319.
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The strongest objection to this construction is that the statute does not
unambiguously require it, and under established doctrine, an agency is permitted to
interpret statutory ambiguities as it reasonably sees fit.138 The best response is that this
principle is trumped by the Avoidance Canon: Agencies are not permitted to construe
statutes in such a way as to raise serious constitutional objections.139 Suppose that we are
tempted to agree with the court of appeals that unless the Avoidance Canon is invoked,
the statute is properly construed to allow the agency to choose between an approach that
requires cost-benefit balancing and an approach that does not. The problem is that under
this approach, the nondelegation problem would reemerge. The solution to that problem
is to hold that “reasonably necessary or appropriate” requires, and does not merely
permit, cost-benefit balancing. It is true, of course, that the Avoidance Canon requires
some intelligible principle, and that cost-benefit balancing is only one candidate; floors
and ceilings, of the kind described above, are the primary alternative.
We shall shortly see that such balancing has significant advantages. For the
moment, it will be useful to see how the agency’s safety regulations fit within the
universe of federal regulations protecting against mortality risks.140

Table 1
Data on Cost per Statistical Life Saved
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Regulation

Agency

Year

Category

Electrical Safety
Childproof Lighters
Logging Operations
Respiratory Protection
Steering Column Protection
Unvented Space Heaters
Safety Standards for
Scaffolds
Trihalomethanes
Cabin Fire Protections
Organ Procurement
AED on Large Planes
Food Labeling
Electrical Power Generation
Stability and Control During
Breaking/Trucks
Mammography Standards
Fuel System integrity
Underground Construction
Passive Restraints
Head Impact Protection
Servicing Wheel Rims
Alcohol and Drug Control
Reflective Devices for Heavy
Trucks
Seat Cushion Flammability
Side Impact and Autos
Medical Devices
Floor Emergency Lighting
Crane Suspended Personnel
Platform
Low-Altitude Windshear
Electrical Equipment
sts/Metal Mines
Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance
Trenching and Excavation
Side Doors
Children's Sleepwear
Flammability
Concrete and Masonry
Construction
Confined Spaces
Hazard Communication

OSHA-S
CPSC
OSHA-S
OSHA-H
NHTSA
CPSC

1990
1993
1994
1998
1967
1980

Safety
Safety
Safety
Other
Safety
Safety

Cost per
statistical
life saved
(millions
of 2002 $)
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2

OSHA-S
EPA
FAA
HHS
FAA
FDA
OSHA-S

1996
1979
1985
1998
2001
1993
1994

Safety
Toxin control
Safety
Other
Other
Other
Safety

0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4

NHTSA
HHS
NHTSA
OSHA-S
NHTSA
NHTSA
OSHA-S
FRA

1995
1997
1975
1983
1984
1995
1984
1985

Safety
Other
Safety
Safety
Safety
Safety
Safety
Safety

0.4
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.9

NHTSA
FAA
NHTSA
FDA
FAA

1999
1984
1990
1996
1984

Safety
Safety
Safety
Other
Safety

0.9
1
1.1
1.1
1.2

OSHA-S
FAA

1984
1988

Safety
Safety

1.5
1.8

MSHA

1970

Safety

1.9

FAA
OSHA-S
NHTSA

1988
1989
1970

Safety
Safety
Safety

2.1
2.1
2.2

CPSC

1973

Safety

2.2

OSHA-S
OSHA-S
OSHA-S

1985
1993
1983

Safety
Safety
Safety

2.4
2.5
3.1
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Regulation

Agency

Year

Category

Child Restraints
Benzene/Fugitive Emissions
Rear/Up/Shoulder
Belts/Autos
Tire Pressure Monitoring
Systems*
Asbestos
EDB Drinking Water
NOX SIP Call

NHTSA
EPA

1999
1984

Safety
Toxin control

Cost per
statistical
life saved
(millions
of 2002 $)
3.3
3.7

NHTSA

1989

Safety

4.4

DOT
OSHA-H
EPA
EPA
DOTNHTSA

2005
1972
1991
1998

Safety
Toxin control
Toxin control
Other

4.8
5.5
6
6

2004

Safety

6.3

EPA

1988

Toxin control

6.4

EPA
FRA

1984
1997

Toxin control
Safety

6.9
7.1

EPA
OSHA-S

2001
1988

Toxin control
Safety

8.2
11

MSHA
OSHA-H
EPA
OSHA-H
EPA

1970
1997
1986
1987
1986

Safety
Toxin control
Toxin control
Toxin control
Toxin control

13
13
19
22
27

EPA

1983

Toxin control

28

EPA
OSHA-H

1990
1978

Toxin control
Toxin control

29
31

EPA
OSHA-H

1990
1992

Toxin control
Toxin control

35
36

EPA
OSHA-H

1991
1976

Toxin control
Toxin control

50
51

EPA
OSHA-H
OSHA
OSHA-H
EPA

1983
1986
1994
1978
1989

Toxin control
Toxin control
Toxin control
Toxin control
Toxin control

53
66
71
77
78

Occupant Crash Protection*
Benzene/Revised Coke by
Products
Radionuclides/Uranium
mines
Roadway Worker Protection
Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source
Contaminants Monitoring*
Grain Dust
Electrical Equipment
Standards/Metal Mines
Methylene Chloride
Arsenic/Glass paint
Benzene
Arsenic/Copper smelter
Uranium Mill
Tailings/Inactive
Hazardous Wastes Listing
for Petroleum Sludge
Acrylonitrile
Benzene/Revised: Transfer
Operations
4.4 methlyenedianiline
Nat. Primary & Secondary
Drinking Water Regulations
Phase II
Coke Ovens
Uranium mill
Tailings/Active
Asbestos
Asbestos/Construction
Arsenic
Asbestos Ban
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Regulation

Agency

Year

Category

Ethylene Oxide
Lockout/ Tagout
Hazardous Waste
Management/Wood Products
DES (Cattlefeed)
Benzene/Revised: Waste ops
Land Disposal Restrictions
Sewage Sludge Disposal
Hazardous Waste: Solids
Dioxin
Prohibit Land Disposal
Land Disposal
Restrictions/Phase II
Drinking Water: Phase II
Formaldehyde
Solid Waste Disposal
Facility Criteria

OSHA-H
OSHA-S

1984
1989

Toxin control
Safety

Cost per
statistical
life saved
(millions
of 2002 $)
80
98

EPA
FDA
EPA
EPA
EPA

1990
1979
1990
1990
1993

Toxin control
Toxin control
Toxin control
Toxin control
Toxin control

140
170
180
530
530

EPA
EPA

1986
1988

Toxin control
Toxin control

560
1100

EPA
EPA
OSHA-H

1994
1992
1987

Toxin control
Toxin control
Toxin control

2600
19000
78000

EPA

1991

Toxin control

100000

What is striking about the OSHA’s safety rules is the variability in cost per life
saved – from a low of $100,000 (a real bargain) to a high of $11 million (above the
standard figure, within the federal government, of around $6 million141). The fact that
OSHA safety regulations are concentrated toward the lower end of the range suggests the
possibility of further opportunities for life-saving regulations. To be sure, these particular
figures should be taken with many grains of salt, among other things because they do not
include savings short of mortalities averted. The only point is that a glimpse at the figures
shows significant and apparently inexplicable variability across safety regulations. Costbenefit analysis might well help to increase sense and coherence.
Of course any cost-benefit approach leaves some crucial questions unanswered.
Hard-line enthusiasts for the nondelegation doctrine might object that those questions are
so large that cost-benefit analysis, in the abstract, itself raises nondelegation concerns.
What is the appropriate valuation of a statistical risk of mortality142? Should a statistical
life be valued at $1 million, $6 million, $10 million, or $30 million? How should the
141
142

See Sunstein, supra note.
For relevant discussion, see Viscusi, supra note; Sunstein, Valuing Life, supra note.
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agency value the thousands of injuries, falling short of mortality, that come from
workplace accidents? Independent of the question of valuation, must the agency follow a
strict cost-benefit test, in accordance with which regulations are banned if the monetary
costs outweigh the monetary benefits? Or should the agency be permitted to give weight
as well to distributional factors – as, for example, through a decision that a monetized
cost of $900 million justifies a monetized benefit of $700 million, after a finding the
latter would be felt by employers and their customers, whereas the latter would be felt
largely by workers, given a chance to live longer and healthier lives?
To require a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits, it is not necessary
for courts to answer such questions. In light of the worker-protective goals of OSHA,
surely it would be legitimate and perhaps mandatory to take account of redistributive
goals,143 and to proceed if workers would be significantly benefited and if the costs are at
least proportionate to that benefit. The agency should therefore be required to show, not
that a regulation satisfies a strict cost-benefit test, but that the costs have a reasonable
relationship to the benefits. If the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits, the
agency should be permitted to proceed so long as there is such a relationship between the
two. Recall that even if a safety regulation fails a cost-benefit test by standard measures,
it might produce welfare benefits on net. We have seen that those standard measures
involve “willingness to pay,”144 and they are only a crude measure of welfare effects.145
The agency could well decide that a rule would have desirable welfare effects even if the
monetized benefits were lower than the monetized costs.
To be sure, authority to consider distributive goals increases the discretion given
to the agency; but so long as the benefits and costs must be shown to be proportional, the
constitutional problem is not serious. I have emphasized that a cost-benefit approach to
workplace safety regulations would raise many questions, but one of the advantages of
that approach is that it would force the agency to ask and answer those questions in
public. In addition, a proportionality test would have the advantage of fitting plausibly
143
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well with the agency’s own practice, both in terms of its conclusions and its standard
rationale.146 We have seen that the agency typically strives to give some accounting of
both costs and benefits – and that in general, a reasonable relationship seems to exist
between the two. The problem is that without the pressure of legal constraint, the
agency’s inquiry into costs and benefits is ad hoc and undisciplined, and produces some
of the variability captured in Table 1. A cost-benefit construction, of the sort suggested
here, would ensure greater transparency and regularity. It would also have the advantage
of promoting greater clarity and monitoring of agency discretion – of increasing the
likelihood that when the agency chooses one degree of stringency rather than another, its
judgment can be scrutinized in public.
C.

Of narrowing constructions and subsidiary policymaking: a puzzle and a
clarification
There is a final puzzle, and it raises a large issue with respect to the relationship

between courts and the administrative state. That issue involves the status of narrowing
constructions, designed to avoid nondelegation challenges by construing agency
discretion to be narrow rather than broad.147 Such narrowing constructions are not
uncommon,148 and I have suggested that the cost-benefit approach is best justified as an
example. But the whole approach raises a serious question. The problem, in sum, is that
if, as American Trucking teaches, agencies are not permitted to rescue open-ended
delegations through subsidiary policymaking in the guise of interpretation, courts should
not be permitted to do so either.149 The question therefore arises: What is the status of the
Avoidance Canon, in the specific context of a nondelegation challenge, in the aftermath
of American Trucking?
At first glance, nothing in American Trucking should endanger the use of the
Avoidance Canon. The Court’s suggestion was merely that if a statute does confer openended authority on an agency, the agency cannot eliminate that problem by deciding how
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much discretion to exercise. “The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally
standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power seems to us
internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise–that
is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted–would itself be an
exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.”150 The new nondelegation doctrine,
repudiated by American Trucking, asked agencies to develop “subsidiary policy” by
which to discipline their discretion under open-ended statutes. The reason is that the
development of subsidiary policy counts as an exercise of discretion. It is not
“interpretation.”
If American Trucking is understood in this way, it certainly suggests that courts
cannot rescue a statute from a nondelegation challenge if they are themselves making
subsidiary policy. But when a court is legitimately selecting an interpretation that
narrows agency discretion, it is not really making subsidiary policy, certainly not in the
sense that the court of appeals deemed sufficient, and the Supreme Court irrelevant, in
American Trucking. Instead a court that properly uses the Avoidance Canon is relying on
standard legal materials to hold that of two or more plausible interpretations of a text, the
agency is bound by the one that gives it limited rather than open-ended authority. An
approach of this kind would not be legitimate if the standard legal materials left both
court and agency at sea – if the narrower interpretation does not qualify as an
interpretation at all. But if courts can fairly insist on that interpretation, as a reasonable
way of coming to terms with what Congress has actually said, American Trucking creates
no obstacle.
Here, then, is a possible problem with the approaches I have outlined. Suppose
that the relevant interpretation is really an exercise in policymaking – that courts are
choosing an intelligible principle not on the basis of anything that Congress has done, but
as a means of implementing what judges see as the best way to come to terms with a
difficult problem. Under American Trucking, the “floors and ceilings” approach, and the
cost-benefit approach, would not cure the nondelegation problem if they amounted to
judicial policymaking. But I have argued that on the basis of the standard legal materials,
both approaches are legitimate readings of the legal materials in light of the Avoidance
150
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Canon. If this argument is correct, then judicial insistence on one or another should not
be taken as running afoul of the Court’s rejection of the new nondelegation doctrine.
Conclusion
My goal here has been to explore the meaning and validity of the principal
provision governing occupational safety standards in the United States. Remarkably,
Congress’ sole guidance has been to tell the Secretary of Labor to do whatever is
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” to provide safe and healthful places of
employment. The leading court of appeals decision upholds this provision on the ground
that the agency has developed subsidiary policy by which to limit its own discretion.
After American Trucking, however, this route is unavailable.
In these circumstances, courts have three options. The most aggressive is to
invalidate the statute on constitutional grounds. Notwithstanding its disruptive potential,
this route does not entirely lack appeal. Congress should be expected to do much better
than to instruct the Secretary of Labor to do what he deems “reasonably necessary or
appropriate.” Invalidation of the statute might well have a democracy-forcing function,
one that would spur a degree of national deliberation about how best to protect American
workers from hazards faced in the workplace. Such deliberation could well produce a
greatly improved statute, one that would benefit from a great deal of theoretical and
empirical work since OSHA was first enacted.151 And however aggressive, this approach
would be less radical than it might seem. No other federal regulatory statute confers so
much discretion on federal administrators, at least in any area of such scope, and it is not
difficult to distinguish OSHA from statutes that the Court has upheld.
The least aggressive option, grounded in the Avoidance Canon, is to parse the
statutory language to create floors and ceilings on agency action. The central argument
here is that the agency may not regulate trivial risks (as held in American Petroleum);
must not ignore significant risks; and may not regulate beyond the point of feasibility.
Thus interpreted, is OSHA unconstitutional? The question is not entirely easy to answer.
On the one hand, the agency would have a limited band of operation; the floors and
ceilings would reduce its room to maneuver. And if this interpretation were taken to ban
151
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the agency from making its decisions on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, then the
problem would be close enough to that in American Trucking. The problem is that at a
minimum, the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language seems to permit the
agency to base its decisions on cost-benefit analysis if that is what it seeks to do. The
question then becomes: If the agency is given the discretion to choose between (a) costbenefit analysis or (b) an approach based on significant risk/feasibility, is there a
violation of the nondelegation doctrine? Probably not, but reasonable people might
disagree about how to answer that question.
The third possibility, also grounded in the Avoidance Canon, would be to
construe the statute to require some kind of cost-benefit balancing, rooted in a minimal
requirement of proportionality between costs and benefits. This approach would permit
the Secretary of Labor to decide exactly what cost-benefit analysis entails in the
distinctive context of occupational safety – to assign values to mortality and morbidity
effects and to give significant weight to considerations of equity and fair distribution.
From a strictly doctrinal point of view, an evident advantage of this approach is that it
would fit well with the statutory language while also eliminating the constitutional
problem. And from the standpoint of sound policy, a proportionality requirement would
also have the virtue of increasing the transparency of occupational safety law -- by
ensuring, for the first time, that the key choices are explained in a way that is subject to
public scrutiny and review.152
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